cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/41952045
Summary
Over the past two decades, the Chinese government has been steadily refining their model of internet control using surveillance and censorship technologies domestically while promoting this approach to other nations under the banner of “digital sovereignty”. Through the export of these technologies, China is not only extending its global influence but also laying the foundation for a federated system of internet governance. In this system, Chinese companies provide the infrastructure and expertise for client governments to more easily monitor and control their own networks, while learning from these deployments and improving collective capacity for digital authoritarianism worldwide.
This research by InterSecLab uncovers evidence of the export of a suite of technologies resembling China’s Great Firewall by Geedge Networks, a private company linked to the academic entity ‘Massive and Effective Stream Analysis’ (Mesalab), a research laboratory at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Our team’s investigation identifies a pattern of commercialization of surveillance capabilities, with Geedge Networks offering a suite of products that enable comprehensive monitoring and control of internet users.
InterSecLab’s analysis reveals that Geedge Networks is contracted with governments in Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Myanmar, and one other unknown country to establish sophisticated systems of internet censorship and surveillance. Furthermore, our findings indicate that Geedge Networks is also involved in developing similar systems deployed within China, including in Xinjiang and other regions.
Based on analysis of a leak of more than 100,000 Geedge Networks documents that was shared with InterSecLab, this research sheds light on the features and capabilities of Geedge Networks’ systems, which include deep packet inspection, real-time monitoring of mobile subscribers, granular control over internet traffic, as well as censorship rules that can be tailored to each region. The leak also reveals information about Geedge Networks’ relationship with the academic entity, Mesalab, as well as their interactions with client governments. The implications for data sovereignty are significant, and our findings raise concerns about the commoditization of surveillance and information control technologies.
This research examines the recent development of Geedge Networks’ systems in various countries, including what is known about their deployment timelines. By analyzing the company’s internal documentation, InterSecLab was able to chronicle the expansion of commercially available national firewalls and speculate about the implications for the future of the global internet considering the spread of such systems.